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Abstract
In expert-consultation dialogues, it is inevitable
that an agent will at times have insufficient in-
formation to determine whether to accept or re-
ject a proposal by the other agent. This results in
the need for the agent to initiate an information-
sharing subdialogue to form a set of shared be-
liefs within which the agents can effectively re-
evaluate the proposal. This paper presents a com-
putational strategy for initiating such information-
sharing subdialogues to resolve the system’s uncer-
tainty regarding the acceptance of a user proposal.
Our model determines when information-sharing
should be pursued, selects a focus of information-
sharing among multiple uncertain beliefs, chooses
the most effective information-sharing strategy,
and utilizes the newly obtained information to re-
evaluate the user proposal. Furthermore, our model
is capable of handling embedded information-
sharing subdialogues.
1 Introduction
We have been studying a particular kind of collaborative di-
alogue in which two participants (a consultant and an exe-
cuting agent) collaborate on developing a plan to achieve the
executing agent’s domain goal. In such an environment, the
consultant and the executing agent have different knowledge
about the domain and about the executing agent’s particu-
lar circumstances and preferences that may affect the domain
plan being constructed. Thus, it is inevitable that an agent
will not always immediately accept the actions or beliefs pro-
posed by the other agent. However, an agent should recog-
nize the collaborative nature of the interaction and the fact
that each agent has private knowledge that is not shared by
the other agent. Thus, rather than indiscriminately rejecting
proposals that she does not have sufficient reasons to accept,
a collaborative agent should both share her private knowledge
with the other agent and solicit relevant information from the
∗This material is based upon work supported by the National Sci-
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other agent in order for both agents to effectively re-evaluate
the proposal and come to the most beneficial decision.
Such collaborative information-sharing behaviour is illus-
trated in the following dialogue segment based on transcripts
of naturally occuring dialogues [SRI Transcripts, 1992]. In
this dialogue, a travel agent (T) and a customer (C) are con-
structing a plan for two other agents to travel from San Fran-
cisco to Los Angeles. This segment follows a proposal that
the travelers be booked on a particular USAir flight.
(1) T: Can we put them on American?
(2) C: Why?
(3) T: We’re having a lot of problems on the USAir
seat maps so I don’t know if I can get them
together.
(4) But American whatever we request pretty
much we get.
(5) C: I don’t know if they care if they sit together.
(6) Let’s go ahead and stick with USAir.
In this dialogue, T proposes putting the travelers on American
Airlines instead of USAir in utterance (1). In (2), C questions
T’s motivation for this proposed action — i.e., the support
that T’s private knowledge provides for this proposal. After
T provides her motivation, C informs T in (5) that she rejects
the motivation, re-evaluates the proposal, and in (6) rejects
the actions proposed by T.
This paper presents a computational model for collabo-
rative information-sharing during proposal evaluation. Our
model first uses the system’s existing beliefs along with ev-
idence provided by the user to evaluate user proposals and
to determine whether they should be accepted or rejected.
If the system has insufficient information to make this deci-
sion, it initiates an information-sharing subdialogue to form
a set of shared beliefs within which the agents can effectively
re-evaluate the proposal and come to agreement. This may
lead to evaluation of an agent’s reasons for a proposal and
further information-sharing about an agent’s beliefs support-
ing these reasons, thus leading to an embedded information-
sharing subdialogue.
Our research contributes to response generation in collab-
orative interaction by 1) providing an algorithm for identi-
fying when an information-sharing subdialogue should be
initiated during proposal evaluation, 2) providing a selec-
tion algorithm for determining the beliefs that should be
the focus of information-sharing, 3) formulating information-
sharing strategies and identifying the criteria for invoking
each strategy, and 4) capturing the process in a Propose-
Evaluate-Modify cycle that enables embedded information-
sharing subdialogues.
2 Modeling Collaborative Activities
In modeling collaborative activities, it is essential that the sys-
tem captures the agents’ intentions conveyed by their utter-
ances. Our model utilizes an enhanced version of the dia-
logue model described in [Lambert and Carberry, 1991] to
represent the current status of the interaction. The enhanced
dialogue model has four levels: the domain level which con-
sists of the domain plan being constructed for later execution,
the problem-solving level which contains the actions being
performed to construct the domain plan, the belief level which
consists of the mutual beliefs pursued to further the problem-
solving intentions, and the discourse level which contains the
communicative actions initiated to achieve the mutual beliefs
[Chu-Carroll and Carberry, 1994].
In our earlier work, we developed a plan-based model
that captures collaborative planning in a Propose-Evaluate-
Modify cycle of actions [Chu-Carroll and Carberry, 1994].
This model treats a collaborative planning process as a se-
quence of the following actions: agent A’s proposal of a set of
actions and beliefs to be added to the shared plan [Grosz and
Sidner, 1990; Allen, 1991] being developed, agent B’s eval-
uation of the proposed actions and beliefs, and B’s proposed
modifications to the original proposal in cases where the pro-
posal is rejected. Notice that B’s proposed modifications will
again be evaluated by A, and if conflicts arise, A may pro-
pose modifications to B’s proposed modifications, resulting
in a recursive process.
However, our previous research assumed that an agent’s
evaluation of a proposal always results in the proposal being
accepted or rejected, and did not take into account cases in
which the agent initially has insufficient information to deter-
mine whether or not to accept the proposal, as shown in the
example in utterances (1)-(6). This paper extends our earlier
work by providing a computational strategy for collaborative
information-sharing during proposal evaluation. We focus on
situations in which the system’s lack of knowledge occurs
during the evaluation of proposals at the belief level of the
dialogue model.1
1We are concerned with situations in which the system recog-
nizes the user’s proposal but cannot decide whether to accept or
reject it, not those where the system initiates a clarification subdi-
alogue to disambiguate the user’s proposal [van Beek et al., 1993;
Logan et al., 1994; Heeman and Hirst, 1992; Raskutti and Zuker-
man, 1993].
Evaluate-Belief( bel):
1. evidence set ← bel (appropriately endorsed as conveyed by
the user) and the system’s beliefs that support or attack bel.
2. If bel has no children, return Evaluate( bel, evidence set).
3. Evaluate each of bel’s children: bel1, . . . , beln:
3.1 belief result ← Evaluate-Belief( beli)
3.2 rel result ← Evaluate-Belief(supports( beli, bel))
3.3 If belief result = reject or rel result = reject, ignore beli
and supports( beli, bel).
3.4 Else if belief result = rel result = accept, add { beli, sup-
ports( beli, bel)} to the evidence set.
3.5 Else if belief result = unsure or rel result = unsure, add
{ beli, supports( beli, bel)} to the potential evidence set.
4. Evaluate bel:
4.1 upperbound ← Evaluate( bel, evidence set + potential
evidence set)
4.2 lowerbound ← Evaluate( bel, evidence set)
4.3 If upperbound = lowerbound = accept, accept bel.
4.4 Else if upperbound = lowerbound = reject, reject bel.
4.5 Else unsure about bel; annotate bel with upperbound,
lowerbound, evidence set, and potential evidence set.
Figure 1: Algorithm for Evaluating a Belief
3 Information-Sharing During Collaboration
Since a collaborative agent initiates information-sharing sub-
dialogues to help determine whether to accept or reject a
proposed belief, the information-sharing process is captured
as part of the evaluation process in the Propose-Evaluate-
Modify cycle for collaborative activities. Thus the evalua-
tion of a proposed belief involves the agent 1) determining
the acceptance of the proposed belief based on the informa-
tion currently available to her, and 2) in cases where she can-
not decide whether to accept or reject the belief, initiating
an information-sharing subdialogue so that the agents can ex-
change information and re-evaluate the proposed belief. The
following sections describe these two processes.
3.1 Evaluating Proposed Beliefs
Our system maintains a set of beliefs about the domain
and about the user’s beliefs. Associated with each be-
lief is a strength that represents the agent’s confidence in
holding the belief. We model the strength of a belief us-
ing endorsements [Cohen, 1985], following [Galliers, 1992;
Logan et al., 1994], based on the semantic form of the ut-
terance used to convey a belief, the level of expertise of the
agent conveying the belief, stereotypical beliefs, etc.
The belief level of our dialogue model consists of one or
more belief trees where the belief represented by a child node
is intended to support that represented by its parent. When
an agent proposes a new belief and gives (optional) support-
ing evidence for it, this set of proposed beliefs is represented
as a belief tree. The system must then evaluate the proposed
beliefs in order to determine whether to accept the proposal,
reject it, or pursue information-sharing to allow the agents to
re-evaluate it. The algorithm for evaluating proposed beliefs
is shown in Figure 1, and is applied to the root node of each
proposed belief tree (the top-level proposed beliefs). Since
the acceptance of a child belief may affect the acceptance of
its parent, before determining the acceptance of a belief or
evidential relationship, its children in the proposed belief tree
must be evaluated (step 3). Thus, for each child belief of
bel, the system evaluates both the belief (step 3.1) and the
evidential relationship between the belief and bel (step 3.2).
A piece of evidence is marked as 1) accepted if both the child
belief and the evidential relationship are accepted, 2) rejected
if either the child belief or the evidential relationship is re-
jected, and 3) uncertain otherwise.
To determine the status (accepted, rejected, or uncertain)
of a belief bel, the algorithm constructs an evidence set that
contains the user’s proposal of bel, endorsed according to the
user’s level of expertise in that subarea as well as the user’s
strength in the belief as conveyed by the semantic form of the
utterance (step 1), the system’s own beliefs pertaining to bel
(step 1), and evidence proposed by the user that is accepted
by the system (step 3.4). It also constructs a potential evi-
dence set consisting of evidence proposed by the user whose
acceptance is undetermined (step 3.5). The algorithm must
then determine whether the potential evidence could have an
impact on the system’s decision-making. It first evaluates
bel by invoking the Evaluate function2 to compute an up-
perbound and a lowerbound for the system’s acceptance of
bel. The upperbound is computed by invoking the Evalu-
ate function with evidence from both the evidence set and the
potential evidence set, i.e., treating all uncertain evidence as
accepted, and the lowerbound is computed by invoking Eval-
uate with only the evidence set, i.e., treating all uncertain
evidence as rejected (steps 4.1 and 4.2). If bel is either ac-
cepted or rejected in both cases, indicating that the uncer-
tainty of the evidence, if any, does not affect the acceptance
of bel, the system accepts or rejects bel (steps 4.3 and 4.4).
Otherwise, the system has insufficient information to deter-
mine the acceptance of bel and it is marked as uncertain (step
4.5). If the top-level proposed belief is marked as uncertain,
an information-sharing subdialogue will be initiated, as de-
scribed in the next section.
3.2 Initiating Information-Sharing Subdialogues
A collaborative agent, when facing a situation in which she is
uncertain about whether to accept a proposal, should attempt
to share information with the other agent so that each agent
can knowledgably re-evaluate the proposal and the agents can
come to agreement — to do otherwise is to fail in her respon-
sibilities as a collaborative agent. Furthermore, a collabora-
tive agent should engage in effective and efficient dialogues;
2Evaluate utilizes a simplified version of Galliers’ belief revi-
sion mechanism [Galliers, 1992; Logan et al., 1994] which, given a
set of evidence, compares the endorsements of the beliefs that sup-
port and attack bel and determines whether or not bel should be
accepted.
Upper Lower Action
1 accept accept accept bel
2 accept unsure attempt to accept uncertain children in
order to accept bel
3 accept reject actions in cases 2 and 5
4 unsure unsure resolve uncertainty regarding bel itself
5 unsure reject attempt to reject uncertain children in
order to reject bel
6 reject reject reject bel
Figure 2: Combinations of Upperbounds and Lowerbounds
thus she should pursue the information-sharing subdialogue
that she believes will most likely result in the agents com-
ing to an intelligent decision about the proposal. The process
for initiating information-sharing subdialogues involves two
steps: selecting a focus of information-sharing from the pro-
posed beliefs marked as uncertain during the initial evaluation
process, and selecting an effective information-sharing strat-
egy.
Selecting the Focus of Information-Sharing
The possible combinations of the upperbound and lower-
bound values produced by the Evaluate-Belief algorithm
(Figure 1) are shown in Figure 2.3 Cases 1 and 6 correspond
to steps 4.3 and 4.4 in Figure 1, respectively, in which the de-
cision to accept or reject is the same whether or not beliefs in
the potential evidence set are accepted. In these cases, the un-
certainty in the child beliefs need not be resolved since their
acceptance will not impact acceptance of the parent belief that
they are intended to support, and thus will not affect accep-
tance of the top-level proposed belief that is important to the
plan being constructed.4 In case 4, the system will remain
unsure whether to accept or reject bel regardless of whether
the uncertain child beliefs, if any, are accepted or rejected,
i.e., resolving the uncertainty in the child beliefs will not help
resolve the uncertainty in bel. Thus, the system should focus
on sharing information to resolve the uncertainty about bel
itself instead of its children. In cases 2 and 3, acceptance of
the child beliefs has the potential to influence acceptance of
bel and in cases 3 and 5, rejection of the child beliefs can lead
to rejection of bel. Thus in all three cases, the system should
initiate information-sharing that will allow the agents to come
to agreement about the currently uncertain child beliefs.
However, there may be more than one uncertain child
belief. Thus when the system initiates information-sharing,
it must first select a belief on which to focus during the
information-sharing process. Our algorithm for selecting the
3Our model assumes that a child belief is always intended to pro-
vide support for its parent belief (a piece of counterevidence is repre-
sented as a child belief supporting the negation of the parent belief);
thus only six out of the nine theoretically possible combinations may
occur.
4Young et al. [Young et al., 1994] argued that if a belief is ac-
cepted even though a child belief that is intended to support it is
rejected, the rejection of the child belief need not be addressed since
it is no longer relevant. Our strategy extends this concept to uncer-
tain information.
Select-Focus-Info-Sharing( bel):
1. If bel is accepted or rejected, focus ← {}, return focus.
2. If bel has no children, focus ← bel; return focus.
3. If upper = lower = uncertain, focus ← bel; return focus.
4. If upper = accept,
4.1 Assign each piece of uncertain evidence ( beli and sup-
ports( beli, bel)) to a set, and order the sets according to
how close the beliefs in each set were to being accepted.
Call them set1, . . . , setm.
4.2 For each set in ranked order, do until new resulti = ac-
cept:
new resulti ← Evaluate( bel, evidence set + seti)
4.3 If new resulti 6= accept, increase set size by one, re-rank
sets and goto 4.2;
4.4 Else
focus ←
⋃
elj∈ seti Select-Focus-Info-Sharing( elj);
return focus.
5. If lower = reject,
5.1 Assign each piece of uncertain evidence ( beli and sup-
ports( beli, bel)) to a set, and order the sets according to
how close the beliefs in each set were to being rejected.
Call them set1, . . . , setm.
5.2 For each set in ranked order, do until new resulti = reject:
new resulti ← Evaluate( bel, evidence set + potential
evidence set - seti)
5.3 If new resulti 6= reject, increase set size by one, re-rank
sets and goto 5.2;
5.4 Else
focus ←
⋃
elj∈ seti Select-Focus-Info-Sharing( elj);
return focus.
Figure 3: Selecting the Focus of Information-Sharing
focus of information-sharing is shown in Figure 3. Select-
Focus-Info-Sharing is initially invoked with bel instantiated
as the top-level proposed belief. Step 3 of the algorithm corre-
sponds to case 4 in Figure 2 where the uncertainty in the child
beliefs is irrelevant to the acceptance of bel; thus the focus of
information-sharing is bel itself. Steps 4 and 5 of the algo-
rithm correspond to cases 2, 3 and 5 in Figure 2 where the sys-
tem attempts to share information to resolve the uncertainty
in the child beliefs and perhaps thereby accept or reject bel.
Step 4 of the algorithm is concerned with cases where the
potential acceptance of uncertain child beliefs may lead to
the acceptance of bel (cases 2 and 3 in Figure 2). In select-
ing the focus of information-sharing in such cases, two fac-
tors should come into play: 1) how strongly the acceptance of
each piece of evidence affects the acceptance of bel — the
stronger the impact that the potential evidence can have on the
acceptance of bel, the more useful it is to expend effort on
resolving the uncertainty about the proposed evidence, and
2) how close each piece of evidence was to being accepted
during the initial evaluation process — the closer a piece of
evidence is to being accepted, the easier it is for the system
to gather sufficient information to accept the evidence. Our
algorithm first constructs a singleton set for each piece of un-
certain evidence for bel, where a piece of evidence includes
a pair of beliefs: a child belief, beli, and the evidential rela-
tionship between beli and bel, supports( beli, bel). The sets
are ordered according to how close the beliefs in a set were
to being accepted in the initial evaluation process (step 4.1).
The first set ( set1) is then added to the evidence set, and bel
is re-evaluated with respect to the augmented evidence set
(step 4.2), thus considering the potential effect of the accep-
tance of beliefs in set1 on the acceptance of bel. If the result
of the evaluation is to accept bel, indicating that resolving
the uncertainty of the beliefs in set1 is sufficient to resolve
the uncertainty of bel, then Select-Focus-Info-Sharing is
recursively applied to each belief in set1 in order to deter-
mine the focus for resolving the uncertainty of beliefs in set1
(step 4.4). On the other hand, if the evaluation indicates that
accepting set1 does not result in the acceptance of bel, the
next set ( set2) is tried. This continues until either the uncer-
tain evidence in a set is predicted to resolve the uncertainty
of bel, or all of the uncertain evidence is tried and none suf-
fices for acceptance of bel. In the latter case, the set size
is increased by one, sets of the requisite size are constructed
by combining individual pieces of evidence, the new sets are
ordered, and the same process is repeated (step 4.3). Thus
our algorithm guarantees that the fewest possible beliefs are
selected as the focus of information-sharing and that these be-
liefs require the least effort to achieve among those that are
strong enough to affect the acceptance of bel.5
Step 5 of the algorithm corresponds to cases 3 and 5 in
Figure 2. The procedure for step 5 is similar to that for step 4
except that in predicting the effect of resolving a piece of un-
certain evidence, bel is evaluated under the assumption that
the set of uncertain evidence under consideration is rejected
while the other uncertain beliefs are accepted (step 5.2).
Selecting an Information-Sharing Strategy
We have identified four strategies which a collaborative agent
may adopt in initiating an information-sharing subdialogue to
allow the agents to share information and re-evaluate a belief
or evidential relationship, bel:
1. Agent A may present a piece of evidence against bel
and (implicitly) invite agent B to attack it. Such a strat-
egy focuses B’s attention on the counterevidence and
suggests that it is what keeps A from accepting bel.
Thus in collaborative activities, this strategy should only
be employed if A’s counterevidence is critical, i.e., if
proving that the counterevidence is invalid will cause A
to accept bel. This strategy also allows the possibil-
ity of B accepting the counterevidence and perhaps both
agents subsequently adopting ¬ bel instead of bel.
5In cases where the focus set contains multiple beliefs, additional
processing is needed to determine the most coherent order in which
to address the beliefs.
2. Agent A may query B about his reasons for believing in
bel. This strategy is appropriate when A does not know
B’s support for bel, and also does not have evidence
against bel herself. It would result either in A gathering
evidence that contributes toward her adopting bel, or in
A discovering B’s invalid justification for holding bel
and attempting to convince B of ¬ bel.
3. Agent A may query B for his evidence for bel and also
present her reasons for believing in ¬ bel. This strategy
is adopted when A does not know B’s reasons for be-
lieving bel, but does have non-critical evidence against
accepting bel. In this case B may provide his support
for bel, attack A’s evidence against bel, or accept A’s
counterevidence and perhaps subsequently adopt ¬ bel.
4. Agent A may indicate her uncertainty about bel and
present her reasons against bel. This strategy is adopted
when A is least certain about how to go about sharing in-
formation to resolve the uncertainty — when A already
knows B’s reasons for believing bel, and only has non-
critical evidence against accepting bel. In a collabora-
tive environment, A’s indication of the uncertainty in her
decision should lead B to provide information that he
believes will help A re-evaluate the proposal.
The process for initiating information-sharing subdia-
logues is performed by invoking the Share-Info-Reevaluate-
Belief problem-solving action on the focus identified by
Select-Focus-Info-Sharing (Figure 3). It initiates an
information-sharing subdialogue using the most appropriate
of the four information-sharing strategies and re-evaluates the
top-level belief taking into account the newly obtained infor-
mation. The recipe6 for Share-Info-Reevaluate-Belief spec-
ifies that in order for the action to be invoked, it must be
the case that the system believes in neither a top-level pro-
posed belief ( bel) nor its negation — that is, the system
cannot determine whether to accept or reject bel. The body
of Share-Info-Reevaluate-Belief consists of alternative subac-
tions which correspond to the aforementioned strategies that
a collaborative agent can use to pursue information-sharing.
The recipes for two of these subactions are shown in Figure 4.
The first specialization, Reevaluate-After-Invite-Attack,
corresponds to the first information-sharing strategy in which
the system ( s1) has a piece of critical evidence ( bel2)
against believing bel1, a belief proposed by the user ( s2)
and about which the system is uncertain. This criterion is
captured in the applicability conditions7 of the action: the
conditions that the system is uncertain about the acceptance
of bel1, that the system believes in bel2 which provides
support for ¬ bel1, and that the system’s disbelief in bel2
will result in its adoption of bel1. The preconditions of
6A recipe [Pollack, 1986] is a template for performing actions.
It contains the applicability conditions for performing an action, the
subactions comprising the body of an action, etc.
7Applicability conditions are conditions that must already be sat-
isfied in order for an action to be reasonable to pursue, whereas an
agent can try to achieve unsatisfied preconditions.
Action: Reevaluate-After-Invite-Attack( s1, s2, bel1, top-belief,
belief-tree)
Type: Decomposition
Appl Cond: uncertain( s1, bel1)
believe( s1, bel2)
believe( s1,supports( bel2,¬ bel1))
results-in(believe( s1,¬ bel2),believe( s1, bel1))
Constraint: member-of( bel1, belief-tree)
root-of( belief-tree, top-belief)
Preconds: MB( s1, s2, bel2) ∧ MB( s1, s2,supports( bel2,¬ bel1))
∨ MB( s1, s2,¬ bel2)
∨ MB( s1, s2,¬supports( bel2,¬ bel1))
Body: Evaluate-Proposed-Beliefs( s1, s2, top-belief)
Goals: believe( s1, top-belief) ∨ believe( s1,¬ top-belief)
Action: Reevaluate-After-Ask-Why( s1, s2, bel1, top-belief,
belief-tree)
Type: Decomposition
Appl Cond: ¬knowref( s1, bel2, believe( s2,supports( bel2, bel1))
¬knowref( s1, bel3, supports( bel3,¬ bel1))
Constraint: member-of( bel1, belief-tree)
root-of( belief-tree, top-belief)
Preconds: knowref( s1, bel2, believe( s2, supports( bel2, bel1)))
Body: Evaluate-Proposed-Beliefs( s1, s2, top-belief)
Goals: believe( s1, top-belief) ∨ believe( s1,¬ top-belief)
Figure 4: Specializations of Share-Info-Reevaluate-Belief
Reevaluate-After-Invite-Attack, however, show that the action
cannot be performed until one of the following conditions is
true: 1) the system and the user mutually believe (MB) in
bel2 and mutually believe that bel2 supports ¬ bel1, 2) the
system and the user mutually believe in ¬ bel2, or 3) the sys-
tem and the user mutually believe that bel2 does not support
¬ bel1. In order to satisfy the preconditions, the system will
adopt the Express-Doubt discourse action [Lambert and Car-
berry, 1992], in which the system expresses doubt at bel1
by contending bel2 and the evidential relationship between
bel2 and ¬ bel1, as an attempt to achieve MB(S,U, bel2) and
MB(S,U, supports( bel2,¬ bel1)).8 Thus the system will ini-
tiate an information-sharing subdialogue by expressing its ev-
idence against the proposed belief and inviting the user to
comment on it. If the outcome of the information-sharing
subdialogue satisfies one of the preconditions of Reevaluate-
After-Invite-Attack, the system can perform the body of the
action and re-evaluate top-belief (the root node of the pro-
posed belief tree of which bel1 is a part) taking into account
the newly obtained information. Notice that the user’s re-
sponse to the Express-Doubt discourse action is again con-
sidered a proposal of mutual beliefs and will be evaluated
by the system. The system may again have insufficient in-
formation to determine whether to accept or reject the new
proposal which was intended to resolve the uncertainty of the
8These two mutual beliefs are selected as preconditions to be sat-
isfied because the system itself holds these beliefs. The alternative
preconditions are present in order to capture situations in which the
user, in response to the Express-Doubt action, convinces the system
that bel2 is false or that bel2 does not serve as justification for
¬ bel1. The use of these alternative preconditions will be demon-
strated in Section 4.2.
previous proposal. It will then initiate another information-
sharing subdialogue to resolve the new uncertainty, resulting
in embedded information-sharing subdialogues.
The second specialization of Share-Info-Reevaluate-Belief
is Reevaluate-After-Ask-Why, which corresponds to the
second information-sharing strategy in which the system
attempts to find out the user’s justification for believing bel1.
The action is applicable (Figure 4) if the system ( s1) does
not know the user’s ( s2’s) justification for holding bel1,
and also does not have any evidence against bel1 itself. We
argue that a collaborative agent should not accept a proposed
belief merely because of the lack of evidence to the contrary.
Instead, she should only accept a belief if the evidence
supporting the belief is strong enough to warrant acceptance.
For instance, suppose a student informs his advisor that the
AI course scheduled for next semester has been canceled,
without giving any justification for it (such as attributing the
source of the knowledge); although the advisor may not have
evidence against believing in the cancellation, she does not
immediately accept the proposed belief because, given the
student’s presumed low expertise in the domain, the endorse-
ment attached to the proposed belief is not reliable enough to
warrant acceptance. The precondition of Reevaluate-After-
Ask-Why indicates that the action can be performed only
if the system knows the user’s evidence for holding bel1.
In order to satisfy this precondition, the system will adopt
discourse actions to query the user for such information, thus
initiating an information-sharing subdialogue.
4 Example
Suppose that the system, an expert in the university course
advisement domain, has proposed the options of taking Logic
or Algorithms to satisfy the user’s core course requirement.
Consider the following continuation which illustrates many
of the features of our strategy for information-sharing during
proposal evaluation:
(7) U: Logic is a better choice than Algorithms.
(8) Dr. Smith is teaching Logic.
(9) S: Isn’t Dr. Smith going on sabbatical next year?
(10) U: I thought he postponed his sabbatical until
1996.
(11) S: Why do you think Dr. Smith postponed his sab-
batical until 1996?
(12) Isn’t he spending next year at IBM?
In utterance (9), S initiates an information-sharing subdia-
logue to determine whether to accept or reject the belief that
Dr. Smith is teaching Logic, proposed by U in (8), by express-
ing a strong but not warranted belief9 that Dr. Smith is going
9The strength of a belief falls into one of three categories: war-
ranted, strong, or weak, based on the endorsements of the belief.
on sabbatical next year. In (10), U initiates an information-
sharing subdialogue to determine whether to accept S’s claim
that Dr. Smith is going on sabbatical next year by expressing
his weak belief that Dr. Smith has postponed his sabbatical.
Finally, in (11) and (12), S initiates an information-sharing
subdialogue to determine whether to accept U’s claim that
Dr. Smith has postponed his sabbatical by explicitly query-
ing U’s reasons for holding this belief and expressing her be-
lief that Dr. Smith is spending next year at IBM. The fol-
lowing sections describe how our model will produce these
information-sharing subdialogues.
4.1 Evaluating Utterances (7) and (8)
Utterances (7) and (8) propose two mutual beliefs, Better-
Than(Logic, Algorithms) and Teaches(Smith,Logic), as well
as an evidential relationship that the latter provides support
for the former. When presented these proposed beliefs, the
system will first determine whether to accept or reject the
proposal by invoking Evaluate-Belief (Figure 1) on the top-
level proposed belief, Better-Than(Logic,Algorithms). The
system will evaluate the proposed evidence as part of eval-
uating the belief (step 3 in Figure 1), thus recursively in-
voking Evaluate-Belief on Teaches(Smith,Logic) (step 3.1)
and the proposed evidential relationship (step 3.2). Since
Teaches(Smith,Logic) has no children in the proposed belief
tree, it will be evaluated by a simplified version of Galliers’
belief revision mechanism [Galliers, 1992] (step 2). Sup-
pose that the system has the following evidence pertaining
to Teaches(Smith,Logic): 1) a strong belief that Dr. Smith
usually teaches Logic, 2) a strong belief that Dr. Smith is
going on sabbatical next year and a warranted belief that
going on sabbatical implies that a faculty member is not
teaching courses, and 3) the user’s belief that Dr. Smith is
teaching Logic. The strengths of evidence for and against
Teaches(Smith,Logic) will be combined and compared. In
this case, the strengths of the two sets of evidence are rela-
tively comparable; thus the system will not be able to decide
whether to accept or reject Teaches(Smith,Logic) based on the
available information. The system will then evaluate the pro-
posed evidential relationship (step 3.2). Since the system be-
lieves that 1) the user believes that Dr. Smith is a good teacher
and 2) students generally prefer courses taught by good teach-
ers, Dr. Smith teaching Logic provides support for the user
preferring Logic to Algorithms; thus the proposed evidential
relationship will be accepted. Since the proposed evidential
relationship is accepted while the child belief is uncertain,
this piece of evidence will be added to the potential evidence
set (step 3.5).
The system will then evaluate the top-level proposed
belief, taking into account the result of evaluating its only
piece of evidence provided by the user. The system’s
evidence set for Better-Than(Logic, Algorithms) consists
of a warranted belief that Algorithms is a pre-requisite for
more CS courses than Logic is, which provides some support
for Algorithms being a better choice than Logic, as well
as the user’s statement that Logic is a better choice than
Algorithms. The potential evidence set consists of a pair
of beliefs: the uncertain belief that Dr. Smith is teaching
Logic and the accepted evidential relationship that Dr. Smith
teaching Logic provides support for Logic being a better
choice than Algorithms. When both the evidence set and
the potential evidence set are included in the evaluation, the
system will compute the upperbound of the acceptance of
Better-Than(Logic,Algorithms) to be accept. When consider-
ing only evidence from the evidence set, however, the system
will be uncertain about the acceptance of the proposed
belief. The result of this evaluation corresponds to case 2 in
Figure 2, and results in the need for the system to initiate an
information-sharing subdialogue to resolve the uncertainty.
Since the system cannot decide whether to accept either
of the proposed mutual beliefs, it will select a focus of
information-sharing by invoking Select-Focus-Info-Sharing
(Figure 3) on Better-Than(Logic,Algorithms). Since accep-
tance of the only piece of evidence provided by the user re-
sults in acceptance of the top-level proposed belief (step 4.2),
the algorithm will be applied recursively to the child belief.
Since it in turn has no children, Teaches(Smith,Logic) itself
will be selected as the focus of information-sharing.
The system will now invoke Share-Info-Reevaluate-Belief
on the identified focus. Since the system’s belief that
Dr. Smith is going on sabbatical and its belief in the evidential
relationship that being on sabbatical implies that Dr. Smith is
not teaching Logic constitute the only obstacle against its ac-
cepting Teaches(Smith,Logic), they are considered a piece of
critical evidence. Thus, Reevaluate-After-Invite-Attack will
be selected as the specialization of Share-Info-Reevaluate-
Belief. Figure 5 shows the dialogue model that will be
constructed for this process. In order to satisfy the pre-
conditions of Reevaluate-After-Invite-Attack (Figure 4), the
system will post MB(S,U, On-Sabbatical(Smith, next year))
and MB(S,U, supports(On-Sabbatical(Smith, next year),
¬Teaches(Smith,Logic))) as mutual beliefs to be achieved.
The system will adopt the Express-Doubt discourse action to
convey its strong belief in On-Sabbatical(Smith, next year)
and its warranted belief in supports(On-Sabbatical(Smith,
next year), ¬Teaches(Smith,Logic)). However, the latter will
not be explicitly stated because the system believes that the
user will derive the evidential relationship based on stereo-
typical knowledge and the structure of the discourse.10 Thus
the system would generate the following utterance:
(9) S: Isn’t Dr. Smith going on sabbatical next year?
4.2 Possible Follow-Ups to Utterance (9)
Consider the following alternative responses to (9):
(10a) U: Oh, you’re right. I forgot about that.
(10b) U: He was planning on it, but he told me that he
had decided to postpone it until 1996.
10Walker [Walker, 1994] has shown the importance of IRU’S
(Informationally Redundant Utterances) in efficient discourse. We
leave including appropriate IRU’s for future work.
Arbitrate(S,U,proposed)
Dialogue Model for Utterances (7) and (8)
Evaluate-Proposal(S,U,proposed)
Evaluate-Proposed-Beliefs(S,U,Better-Than(Logic,Algorithms))
Share-Info-Reevaluate-Belief(S,U,Teaches(Smith,Logic),
Better-Than(Logic,Algorithms))
Better-Than(Logic,Algorithms),proposed-belief-tree)
Reevaluate-After-Invite-Attack(S,U,Teaches(Smith,Logic),
MB(S,U,supports(On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year),
~Teaches(Smith,Logic)))
MB(S,U,On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year))
Convey-Belief(S,U,On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year))
Convey-Uncertain-Belief(S,U,On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year))
Surface-Neg-YN-Q(S,U,On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year))
Express-Doubt(S,U,On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year),Teaches(Smith,Logic))
Isn’t Dr. Smith going on sabbatical next year?
Discourse Level
Proposed Problem-Solving Level
Proposed Belief Level
Figure 5: Dialogue Model for Generating Utterance (9)
(10c) U: Yes, but he got a good offer from the depart-
ment to teach Logic while he’s on sabbatical.
(10d) U: I thought he postponed his sabbatical until
1996.
Utterance (10a) will be captured as the user accepting the pro-
posal in Figure 5 and acknowledging it. Utterances (10b)
and (10c) are both the result of the user rejecting the sys-
tem’s proposed mutual beliefs and attempting to modify them
[Chu-Carroll and Carberry, 1995]. In (10b) the user rejects
MB(S,U, On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year)), while in (10c) the
user rejects the evidential relationship MB(S,U, supports(On-
Sabbatical(Smith, next year), ¬Teaches(Smith, Logic))). In
the case where the user responds with (10b), if the system
accepts the proposed belief that Dr. Smith postponed his sab-
batical until 1996, the system and the user achieve the mutual
belief MB(S,U, ¬On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year)). Thus, the
precondition of the Reevaluate-After-Invite-Attack action in
Figure 5 is satisfied, and the system would re-evaluate Better-
Than(Logic,Algorithms) taking into account the newly ob-
tained information. Notice that in this case the mutual be-
lief achieved to satisfy the preconditions of Reevaluate-After-
Invite-Attack is different from the ones the system attempted
to achieve — utterance (9) was generated as an attempt to
achieve MB(S,U, On-Sabbatical(Smith, next year)), but the
result is that both the system and the user accept MB(S,U,
¬On-Sabbatical(Smith, next year)). In this case, although the
goal of the Express-Doubt discourse action is not satisfied, the
agents’ mutual belief achieves the higher-level goal that the
Express-Doubt action is intended to achieve, namely a pre-
condition of Reevaluate-After-Invite-Attack; thus the Express-
Doubt action is abandoned. This example shows how the
precondition of Reevaluate-After-Invite-Attack captures situ-
ations in which the user presents counterevidence to the sys-
tem’s critical evidence and changes the system’s beliefs.
4.3 Evaluating Utterance (10d)
Utterance (10d) will be interpreted as a case in which
the user is uncertain about whether to accept or reject the
system’s proposal in (9) and attempts to share information
with the system to re-evaluate the proposal. It proposes
a mutual belief, Postpone-Sabbatical(Smith,1996), which
will be evaluated by Evaluate-Belief. Suppose the system
believes that Dr. Smith is spending next year at IBM, which
is evidence against Dr. Smith postponing his sabbatical. Then
the system cannot determine the acceptance of the proposed
belief, resulting in the need to initiate an information-sharing
subdialogue. The focus of information-sharing is Postpone-
Sabbatical(Smith,1996) since it is the only uncertain belief.
The system will then select an appropriate information-
sharing strategy. Since the system does not know the user’s
reasons for believing Postpone-Sabbatical(Smith,1996), but
does have a piece of non-critical evidence against the pro-
posed belief, the third information-sharing strategy will be se-
lected. Thus the system would query the user for support for
the proposed belief and also provide its evidence against the
belief, leading to the generation of the following utterances:
(11) S: Why do you think Dr. Smith postponed his sab-
batical until 1996?
(12) Isn’t he spending next year at IBM?
5 Related Work
Grosz, Sidner and Lochbaum [Grosz and Sidner, 1990;
Lochbaum, 1991] developed a SharedPlan approach to mod-
elling collaborative discourse, and Sidner [Sidner, 1994]
formulated an artificial language for modeling such dis-
course. Sidner viewed a collaborative planning process as
proposal/acceptance and proposal/rejection sequences. Her
artificial language treats an utterance such as Why do X? as
a proposal for the hearer to provide support for his proposal
to do X. However, Sidner’s work is descriptive and does not
provide a mechanism for determining when and how such a
proposal should be made nor how responses should be for-
mulated in information-sharing subdialogues.
Several researchers have studied the role of clarification di-
alogues in disambiguating user plans [van Beek et al., 1993;
Raskutti and Zukerman, 1993] and in understanding referring
expressions [Heeman and Hirst, 1992]. Logan et al. [Logan
et al., 1994] developed an automated librarian that could re-
vise its beliefs and intentions and could generate responses
as an attempt to revise the user’s beliefs and intentions. Al-
though their system had rules for asking the user whether he
holds a particular belief and for telling the system’s attitude
toward a belief, the emphasis of their work was on conflict
resolution and plan disambiguation. Thus they did not inves-
tigate a comprehensive strategy for information-sharing dur-
ing proposal evaluation. For example, they did not identify
situations in which information-sharing is necessary, did not
address how to select a focus of information-sharing when
there are multiple uncertain beliefs, did not consider request-
ing the user’s justifications for a belief, etc. In addition, they
do not provide an overall dialogue planner that takes into ac-
count discourse structure and appropriately captures embed-
ded subdialogues.
6 Conclusion
This paper has presented a computational strategy for collab-
orative information-sharing in situations where the system’s
current knowledge does not allow it to make a decision about
whether to accept or reject a user proposal. Our model in-
cludes algorithms for determining when information-sharing
subdialogues should be initiated and for selecting a focus of
information-sharing. The latter algorithm takes into account
both the effect of the acceptance of a piece of evidence on the
acceptance of the top-level belief, and the difficulty in resolv-
ing the uncertainty about acceptance of a piece of evidence.
Furthermore, we have identified four alternative information-
sharing strategies and the criteria under which each should
be invoked, thus allowing the agents to share the most perti-
nent information in order to re-evaluate a proposal. In addi-
tion, by capturing information-sharing as part of the evalua-
tion process in a Propose-Evaluate-Modify cycle of actions,
our model can handle embedded information-sharing subdia-
logues.
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